Transforming Piecemeal Social Engineering into  Grand  Crime Prevention Policy: Toward a New Criminology of Social Control by Freilich, Joshua D. & Newman, Graeme R.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 105 | Issue 1 Article 5
Winter 2015
Transforming Piecemeal Social Engineering into
"Grand" Crime Prevention Policy: Toward a New
Criminology of Social Control
Joshua D. Freilich
Graeme R. Newman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Joshua D. Freilich and Graeme R. Newman, Transforming Piecemeal Social Engineering into "Grand" Crime Prevention Policy: Toward a
New Criminology of Social Control, 105 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (2015).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol105/iss1/5
0091-4169/15/10501-0203 
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 105, No. 1 
Copyright © 2016 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. 
203 
CRIMINOLOGY 
TRANSFORMING PIECEMEAL SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING INTO “GRAND”  
CRIME PREVENTION POLICY: 
TOWARD A NEW CRIMINOLOGY  
OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
 
JOSHUA D. FREILICH, JD, PHD* & 
GRAEME R. NEWMAN, PHD** 
This Article focuses on the Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) 
approach in criminology, which expands the crime reduction role well 
beyond the justice system. SCP sees criminal law in a more restrictive 
sense, as only part of the anticrime effort in governance. We examine the 
“general” and “specific” responses to crime problems in the SCP 
approach. Our review demonstrates that the most serious barrier to 
converting SCP techniques into policy remains the gap that exists between 
problem identification and problem response. We discuss past large-scale 
SCP interventions and explore the complex links between them and SCP’s 
better known specificity and piecemeal approach. We develop a graded 
framework for selecting responses that acknowledge the local, political, 
and organizational issues involved in identifying and choosing them. This 
framework determines when SCP interventions and policies can be crafted 
on the macro level to eliminate or greatly reduce the problem everywhere, 
and when interventions should be limited to a piecemeal, local approach to 
eliminate only the specific problem. Finally, we situate this analysis within 
the general context of the relationship between science and policy, noting 
the challenges in converting scientific observations into broad social policy 
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and the expansion of crime control beyond criminal justice into the realm of 
government regulation and partnerships with nongovernmental agencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The criminal justice system normally focuses on two extremes of 
public action—large-scale legislation of what is considered a crime, and 
individual arrests and prosecutions. Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), a 
leading action-oriented approach in criminology, emphasizes an approach 
between these two extremes.1 It focuses on particular crime problems, 
which may include noncriminal problems,2 usually on a local level, that 
generate several different individual criminal cases. Thus, a “problem” 
drinking establishment may generate a number of alcohol-related offenses 
in its vicinity. Like its sister field problem-oriented policing, SCP’s 
approach begins by defining a problem as beyond any single criminal act or 
any particular legal case. Yet a problem is also smaller than the overall 
disorganization or injustice in a community, society, or the criminal law 
process itself. 
 
1 For an overview of the SCP approach, see Ronald V. Clarke, Seven Misconceptions of 
Situational Crime Prevention, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY 
SAFETY 39 (Nick Tilley ed., 2005). 
2 In addition to reducing crime, SCP has also long been used to prevent or reduce legal 
noncriminal problems that are said to harm individuals or society.  
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SCP calls for minutely analyzing this specific crime type (or problem) 
to uncover what situational factors facilitate a crime’s commission. 
Intervention techniques are then devised to manipulate the situational 
factors. In theory, this approach reduces crime by making it impossible for 
the crime to be committed or by reducing cues that increase a person’s 
motivation to commit a crime during specific types of events.3 SCP is more 
likely to employ civil and administrative law to regulate establishments or 
individual behavior than to seek to arrest offenders one by one. This 
strategy has given rise to a retinue of methods that have been found to 
reduce crime at a local and sometimes national or international level.4 
SCP’s focus is thus on reducing crime opportunities rather than punishing 
or rehabilitating offenders as individuals. In sum, SCP expands the role of 
crime reduction well beyond the justice system. It sees criminal law in a 
much more restrictive sense, as only part of the anticrime effort in 
governance. We come back to this point and expand upon it below. 
In this Article, we describe the “general” and “specific” responses to 
crimes and harmful noncriminal problems that are typical of the SCP 
approach. We demonstrate that there may be inconsistencies, or at least 
some ambivalence, regarding when or how the general or specific responses 
should be applied. We propose a graded framework for selecting responses 
that acknowledge the local, political, and organizational issues involved in 
identifying and choosing them. The framework helps determine when 
interventions and policies can be crafted on the macro level to eliminate or 
greatly reduce the problem everywhere and when interventions should be 
limited to a piecemeal, local approach to only eliminate the specific 
problem. This framework also can determine if a mixed response is needed, 
 
3 For discussions of soft SCP that seeks to reduce cues that increase an individual’s 
motivation to commit a crime during specific situations, see Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. 
Clarke, Opportunities, Precipitators, and Criminal Decisions: A Reply to Wortley’s Critique 
of Situational Crime Prevention, in THEORY FOR PRACTICE IN SITUATIONAL CRIME 
PREVENTION 41, 45–48 (Martha J. Smith & Derek B. Cornish eds., 16 Crime Prevention 
Studies, 2003); Richard Wortley, Situational Precipitators of Crime, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIME ANALYSIS 48 (Richard Wortley & Lorraine Mazerolle eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter Wortley, Situational Precipitators]; Richard Wortley, A Classification of 
Techniques for Controlling Situational Precipitators of Crime, 14 SECURITY J. 63 (2001).  
4 For discussions on the effectiveness of SCP techniques in reducing crime, see Ronald 
V. Clarke, Introduction to SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDIES 1 
(Ronald V. Clarke ed., 2d ed. 1997). For a discussion of the common critique against SCP 
that interventions to reduce crime will simply displace crime to other areas that did not 
receive the intervention, as well as a systematic review of studies that tested this critique and 
instead found that most SCP interventions resulted in an overall crime reduction, see Rob T. 
Guerette & Kate J. Bowers, Assessing the Extent of Crime Displacement and Diffusion of 
Benefits: A Review of Situational Crime Prevention Evaluations, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1331 
(2009). 
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since some situationally bound responses require intervention from a distant 
source. 
In what follows, subparts I(A), (B), and (C) outline different types of 
policies. Subpart I(D) reviews one of SCP’s “seminal themes,” the need to 
focus on specific crimes (and legal problems) to identify effective 
prevention policies.5 In subpart II(A), we discuss SCP’s twenty-five 
techniques, and in subpart II(B) we highlight the difficulties in analyzing 
specific problems that must be overcome to develop large-scale social 
policies. We also outline the importance of resolving this issue. We discuss 
past large-scale SCP interventions and explore any contradictions between 
them and SCP’s better-known piecemeal, local approach. Subpart II(C) sets 
forth our preliminary framework, encompassing three levels of 
interventions—piecemeal or local; macro; and mixed—and provides a set 
of guidelines indicating when and where interventions should be attempted 
on each level. Next, Part III discusses the significant role SCP has played, 
and will continue to play, as an action-oriented, policy-driven approach in 
criminology. Subpart III(A) focuses on the issue of problem ownership 
while subpart III(B) discusses the role of government. Finally, Part IV 
places SCP within the current debates concerning the relationship between 
science and policy in other areas such as environmental pollution, public 
health and climate change. We demonstrate that whether the SCP approach 
should be used to prevent or reduce certain types of behaviors related to 
these issues or problems is a difficult question. The answer to this question 
cannot easily be found in the SCP approach. The decision to use SCP 
strategies to reduce or prevent certain behaviors is often value-driven and 
based upon politics as opposed to science.6  
I. SCP’S SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT AND EFFECTIVE PREVENTION 
POLICIES 
A. LEVELS (TYPES) OF CRIME PREVENTION POLICIES 
Crime prevention policies could be categorized as supersized, 
medium-sized, or little. National governments and multinational 
corporations create supersized general policies. Multinational corporate 
 
5 For discussions on the importance of focusing on specific crime types or problems, see 
Derek B. Cornish & Martha J. Smith, On Being Crime Specific: Observations on the Career 
of R.V.G. Clarke, in THE REASONING CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V. 
CLARKE 30 (Nick Tilley & Graham Farrell eds., 2012).  
6 This is assuming that science is, or ought to be, value free. For a discussion of 
evidence-based research, values, and policy goals, see Todd R. Clear, Policy and Evidence: 
The Challenge to the American Society of Criminology: 2009 Presidential Address to the 
American Society of Criminology, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2010). 
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policies are mostly hidden from the public, except on issues that become a 
matter of public concern and may directly affect corporate interests. 
National governments, however, are forced to publicly state their positions 
or policies. Often, government statements convey an intention to translate 
their positions into laws and regulations of various kinds, or express laws 
already written.7 These government policies are typically divided into two 
substantive kinds: domestic and foreign. Domestic policies state a 
government’s position on crime, health, the economy, education, 
technology, and so on. Foreign policies focus on strategic relations with 
other nations, and include defense, the military, trade, policing of borders, 
international crime, international health, relations with international bodies, 
and regulation of international zones such as fishing areas.8 
Policies of large corporations and nongovernmental organizations may 
range from foreign policy (where to locate a new factory) to internal labor 
relations (sexual harassment guidelines), depending on the size and location 
of the corporation’s operations. 
Policies of state governments and medium-sized businesses fall 
somewhere between large and small. In the United States, much of the 
above is repeated at the state level. Although the right of states to conduct 
foreign relations is limited, there is still considerable activity in that area, 
especially in enticing foreign investment.  
 
7 For a review of the role of government in creating crime prevention policies and their 
implications for multinational corporations with respect to the design of consumer products, 
see Ronald V. Clarke & Graeme R. Newman, Modifying Criminogenic Products: What Role 
for Government?, in DESIGNING OUT CRIME FROM PRODUCTS AND SYSTEMS 7 (Ronald V. 
Clarke & Graeme R. Newman eds., 18 Crime Prevention Studies, 2005). For more recent 
work by Clarke and his associates on trafficking in endangered species that addresses the 
national and international levels of policy derived from a situational approach, as well as 
discussions of SCP strategies that have been successfully applied to reduce poaching and 
other crimes against endangered species, see JACQUELINE L. SCHNEIDER, SOLD INTO 
EXTINCTION: THE GLOBAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES (2012); Stephen Pires & Ronald 
V. Clarke, Are Parrots CRAVED? An Analysis of Parrot Poaching in Mexico, 49 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 122 (2012); Stephen F. Pires & Ronald V. Clarke, Sequential Foraging, 
Itinerant Fences and Parrot Poaching in Bolivia, 51 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 314 (2011).  
8 It is also worth noting that some national policies are specifically implemented to 
reduce crime or other harmful acts. Examples include national policies that address the 
design of cars or cell phones. On the other hand, certain government actions simply build the 
capacity for local action by providing resources to local entities to respond to the problem or 
crime. For example, both the U.S. and British governments have financially supported the 
development of Problem Oriented Policing centers that seek to solve problems locally, in 
accord with local priorities. However, the problem-solving capacity is established centrally. 
See, e.g., Peter Homel, Joining up the Pieces: What Central Agencies Need to Do to Support 
Effective Local Crime Prevention, in PUTTING THEORY TO WORK: IMPLEMENTING 
SITUATIONAL PREVENTION AND PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 111 (Johannes Knutsson & 
Ronald V. Clarke eds., 20 Crime Prevention Studies, 2006).  
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Little policies are those of local governments, counties, cities and 
towns. While these are confined mostly to domestic issues, some cities have 
ranged into the foreign. The New York Police Department, for example, has 
developed its own antiterrorism organization with operatives placed 
abroad.9 But by and large, it is at this level that policies are translated into 
specific ordinances or regulations. For example, the hour at which a builder 
may begin his work in the morning in a residential suburb is regulated by 
many local ordinances. 
B. SCP AND THE LOCAL LEVEL 
It is at this little or local level that, when possible, SCP’s responses are 
usually directed. Tilley explains why this is so by drawing parallels 
between Clarke’s SCP10 and various strains of Popperian thought.11 Both 
perspectives reject schemes to solve large and abstract problems (e.g. 
“inequality”) through grand social engineering initiatives.12 Popper13 and 
Clarke14 reject revolutions and endeavors, such as the Mobilization for 
 
9 See generally MITCHELL D. SILBER, THE AL QAEDA FACTOR (2012) (discussing Al 
Qaeda plots against the United States and other Western nations that were foiled and 
analyzing the factors that may have played a role in thwarting these planned strikes); 
MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE DEP’T, RADICALIZATION IN 
THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT (2007), available at http://www.nypdshield.org/public/
SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/R7ZT-A5TG (reviewing generally the New York Police Department’s 
counterterrorism efforts).  
10 For an overview of Clarke’s SCP claims, see Clarke, supra note 1; P. Mayhew et al., 
Crime as Opportunity, in HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDIES (Home Office Research Study 
No. 34, 1976); R.V.G. Clarke, “Situational” Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice, 20 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 136 (1980)..  
11 See generally Nick Tilley, Karl Popper: A Philosopher for Ronald Clarke’s 
Situational Crime Prevention?, in TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 39 (Shlomo G. Shoham & Paul Knepper eds., 8 Israel Studies in Criminology, 2004) 
(discussing the relationship between Popperian philosophy and SCP). 
12 John W. N. Watkins, Social Knowledge and the Public Interest, in MAN AND THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 173, 178–79 (William A. Robson ed., 1972); Paul Knepper, Situational 
Logic in Social Science Inquiry: From Economics to Criminology, 20 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 
25, 35–39 (2007). 
13 For an overview of Popper’s arguments in favor of small-scale piecemeal 
interventions and a general wariness of large-scale schemes to remake society (due to the 
danger of unintended consequences), see KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS 
ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF PLATO (1945) [hereinafter POPPER, SPELL OF PLATO]; 2 KARL 
POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: THE HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY: HEGEL, MARX, 
AND THE AFTERMATH (1945) [hereinafter POPPER, HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY]; KARL R. 
POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (1963). 
14 For a discussion of SCP’s rejection of large-scale social engineering initiatives, see 
Clarke, supra note 1; Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, in BUILDING A SAFER 
SOCIETY: STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO CRIME PREVENTION 136 (Michael Tonry & David P. 
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Youth implemented by President Johnson in the 1960s, based on grand 
ideas of eradicating juvenile delinquency by eliminating poverty.15 A 
corollary is SCP’s distinctive concern with proximal causes of specific 
problems in both analysis and practice. This emphasis separates SCP from 
other criminological theories that often focus on distal causes of relatively 
wide problems. SCP is also based upon a different view of science and of 
governance than other criminological frameworks, which usually rely on 
the justice system to address crime problems. SCP sees an important role 
for crime reduction for many other governmental departments than the legal 
system, as well as for quasi-governmental actions by private entities.16 
Popper advocated that governments and social scientists tackle small 
problems one at a time.17 The central focus of Clarke’s approach has 
similarly been to use situational analyses of when, where, and how specific 
crimes occur.18 Cornish’s ‘script’ method, which examines the specific 
problem or crime in detail, is usually used to identify possible intervention 
points.19 As Cornish and Clarke explain, crime “[scripts] . . . involve such 
chains of decisions and actions, separable into interdependent stages, 
involving the attainment of sub-goals that serve to further the overall goals 
of the crime.”20 These analyses identify the opportunities that allow crime 
to occur. Analysts are encouraged to review the empirical literature to 
identify similar problems and interventions that were used successfully to 
eliminate or reduce them.21 If no successful interventions in similar settings 
are identified, analysts are trained to apply SCP’s techniques and principles 
from related frameworks, like routine activities theory, to generate 
innovative solutions.22 Typically, many possible solutions emerge from the 
literature or are devised through innovation. 
 
Farrington eds., 19 Crime & Justice, 1995). 
15 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SOC. & REHAB. SERV., A 
SITUATIONAL APPROACH TO DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1970) (calling for large-scale social 
change to eradicate juvenile delinquency); Tilley, supra note 11, at 40–41.  
16 See Clarke, supra note 10. 
17 See POPPER, SPELL OF Plato, supra note 13; POPPER, HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY, supra 
note 13.  
18 See Clarke, supra note 10. 
19 See generally Derek Cornish, The Procedural Analysis of Offending and Its Relevance 
for Situational Prevention, in 3 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 151 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 
1994) (introducing the script approach to criminology for the first time). 
20 Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke, Analyzing Organized Crimes, in RATIONAL 
CHOICE AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 41, 47 (Alex R. Piquero & Stephen G. Tibbetts eds., 
2002).  
21 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., 
CRIME ANALYSIS FOR PROBLEM SOLVERS IN 60 SMALL STEPS (2005) (discussing how 
particular interventions are identified).  
22 For discussions of this point, see John E. Eck, Learning from Experience in Problem-
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In spite of this demonstrated success in crime prevention, SCP has 
been criticized by Michael Benson as “leading to piecemeal, finger-in-a-
dike-type responses to general problems”23 because each crime problem is 
specific to time, place, and opportunity.  
C. SCP AND THE MACRO LEVEL 
Yet some effective interventions are large-scale and general, such as 
the impact of the removal of carbon monoxide from the public gas supply in 
Great Britain on the number of suicides. Clarke and Mayhew exploited that 
change to demonstrate the potential power of SCP interventions.24 Taking 
into account population change and other extraneous variables, the number 
of British suicides fell from about 5,700 people in 1963 to almost 3,700 
people in 1975.25 In the early 1960s, gas suicides accounted for over 40% of 
suicides each year.26 Clarke and Mayhew explained that when the gas was 
available in people’s homes, it was easy to use, deadly, and painless. Other 
forms of suicide, however, lacked these benefits and most motivated gas 
suicide seekers did not turn to other methods when the easy opportunity—
the poisonous public gas supply—was removed.27 The removal of carbon 
monoxide from the public gas supply in Great Britain, in other words, led to 
the almost complete elimination of suicide by gas inhalation. On its face, 
this evidence refutes Benson’s criticism.28 
 
Oriented Policing and Situational Prevention: The Positive Functions of Weak Evaluations 
and the Negative Functions of Strong Ones, in EVALUATION FOR CRIME PREVENTION 93 
(Nick Tilley ed., 14 Crime Prevention Studies, 2002); Paul Ekblom, Ideas Brought back 
from Situational Crime Prevention’s Exploration of Design Against Crime, in THE 
REASONING CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V. CLARKE, supra note 5, at 52, 
54–55, 58–60. Eck also argues that the SCP approach is akin to generative theory. He 
explains that SCP does “not dictate specific actions, but provide[s] a framework for the 
creation of context relevant interventions . . . . These are tools that might work in some 
circumstances but probably do not work in every circumstance.” Eck, supra  at 105.  
23 Michael L. Benson, Offenders or Opportunities: Approaches to Controlling Identity 
Theft, 8 CRIMINOLOGY AND PUB. POL’Y 231, 235 (2009).  
24 See generally Ronald V. Clarke & Pat Mayhew, The British Gas Suicide Story and Its 
Criminological Implications, 10 CRIME & JUST. 79 (1988) (discussing the large-scale 
reduction in suicide, with limited displacement, that occurred as a result of Great Britain’s 
move away from carbon monoxide in the public gas supply). As our colleague noted, it 
could be that large-scale dramatic examples receive more publicity than local, prosaic, case-
by-case, piecemeal SCP interventions. This makes the lack of attention given to this 
contradiction even more puzzling.  
25 See Clarke & Mayhew, supra note 24, at 79. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 This change to natural gas was not designed to reduce suicide. The large-scale 
reduction in suicide was a positive unintended byproduct. Interestingly, SCP has benefited 
from a number of interventions that were implemented for other reasons, but also reduced 
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A public health expert might argue that other methods or types of 
suicide should have been addressed in designing responses, which seems to 
be the basis of Benson’s finger-in-the-dyke criticism. They were addressed, 
but only in respect to displacement of gas suicide to other methods of 
suicide. There was no such displacement. There was no attempt to reduce 
other types of suicide. Thus, while removing coal gas almost entirely 
eliminated gas suicide and reduced the number of suicides overall, it did not 
solve the general problem of suicide in society. In other words, suicide was 
not eliminated. 
D. SCP AND SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS 
How, precisely, specific solutions for the particular problem at issue 
are decided upon remains a bit of a mystery.29 The process appears similar 
to how a doctor diagnoses a range of puzzling symptoms and develops a 
treatment plan, which gives rise to the popular view of medicine as an “art” 
as well as a science. Clarke also offers us diagnostic tools, the famous 
twenty-five techniques of SCP.30 The twenty-five techniques are outlined 
below in Table 1. Clarke explains that the techniques “assist systemization 
of knowledge about situational prevention and . . . provide practical help to 
practitioners.”31 Yet the techniques are not so much diagnostic of the 
situations as they are intervention techniques that might be applied after the 
situation has been analyzed. These techniques have evolved in response to 
critiques that some situations also provoke offenders to act32 and led 
Cornish and Clarke to increase the number of techniques from sixteen to 
twenty-five. 
The techniques help identify appropriate interventions. But if they are 
also used to analyze the problem, it raises the danger that one may find only 
 
crime or other harmful problems. Sometimes these interventions are subsequently used 
elsewhere to intentionally reduce crime and other problems.  
29 For discussions about how specific SCP intervention techniques are identified, see 
Paul Ekblom, Designing Products Against Crime, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME PREVENTION AND 
COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 203; Michael S. Scott, Shifting and Sharing Police 
Responsibility to Address Public Safety Problems, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME PREVENTION AND 
COMMUNITY SAFETY,  supra note 1, at 385.  
30 See Cornish & Clarke, supra note 3, at 90 for the famous twenty-five techniques.  
31 Ronald V. Clarke, Affect and the Reasoning Criminal: Past and Future, in AFFECT 
AND COGNITION IN CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING 35 (2014).  
32 For discussions of Wortley’s important critique, see RICHARD WORTLEY, SITUATIONAL 
PRISON CONTROL: CRIME PREVENTION IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2002) [hereinafter 
WORTLEY, SITUATIONAL PRISON]; Wortley, Situational Precipitators, supra note 3. For a 
discussion of Cornish and Clarke’s subsequent (partial) acceptance of Wortley’s critique—
that motivated offenders do not simply enter into situations that provide opportunities to 
offend, but that certain situations can also create or increase offender motivation to offend—
see Cornish & Clarke, supra note 3.  
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what one is looking for. This is an old problem of empirical science: the 
difficulty in separating theory from observation33 (called the “Oedipus 
effect” by some).34 It is similar to the medical-field phenomenon in which 
physicians may approach an illness with a finite range of treatment plans. 
The diagnosis in many cases is irrelevant to the treatment plan eventually 
chosen to alleviate or remove the symptoms. In the latter case, perhaps, 
there is agreement between SCP and medical diagnosis: there is no need to 
find the “root cause” of the problem if the available treatment plan works. 
Often, different treatments are used until one does work. In sum, it is the 
intervention plan that matters most in diagnosing a problem and responding 
to it. Do the twenty-five techniques do the job? 
II. THE TWENTY-FIVE TECHNIQUES: WHAT ARE THEY, REALLY? 
A. SCP’S TECHNIQUES AS GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Table 1 reproduces the basic framework of SCP’s twenty-five 
techniques. Presented in this way, one can see that they are not techniques 
at all. They say what to do, but they do not say how to do it. They do, 
however, clearly urge one to do something. The general headings are listed 
in Column 1 and are based upon five areas that originate from various 
social psychological theories related to rational choice and behavior 
modification. Those theories all presume that certain environmental and 
psychological factors cause a specific crime. But because these headings 
are written in the language of advocacy rather than science,35 they are a 
curious mixture of policy and causation. All social policies are written in 
such language: they presume particular causes and advocate action. 
The five headings might best be construed as a set of guiding 
principles, each of which contains a list of measures that might reduce the 
probability of a crime event. The principles reflect differing assumptions 
about the psychology of offending, but are all intended to lead to responses 
that affect the decisionmaking processes of offenders and thereby reduce 
offenses. Consider, for example, gun violence. Accepting the SCP scientific 
observation that the easy availability of guns is one cause of gun violence 
 
33 See Ekblom, supra note 22, who similarly notes that prevention policies also implicate 
verbal issues. One intervention can be explained in a variety of ways. For instance, a 
burglary initiative could be portrayed as aiding the homeowner (purposive), or thwarting the 
perpetrator (reverse-purposive). Crime prevention proponents often are unclear in their 
description of these interventions. Ekblom concludes that “the important thing is for 
practitioners and researchers to be self-aware of which discourse they are using.” Id. at 58. 
34 Knepper, supra note 12, at 28. 
35 That science is, or ought to be, “value free” is of course a separate issue that would 
take us beyond this Article. 
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leads to the conclusion that we should increase the effort needed to acquire 
a gun. It seems obvious. But it is not.36 It is a leap from “increasing the 
effort” to, for example, forbidding the sale of guns, requiring background 
checks, requiring that guns be manufactured so that they do not work except 
in the hands of the registered owner, or requiring substantial gun-use 
training. We are not advocating these policies, but rather simply 
highlighting how difficult it is to proceed from the initial scientific 
observation to a social policy that is actually linked to the science. 
The five guiding principles are each matched with five specific 
examples or techniques in Column 2. Each technique advocates action and 
is more specific than the general principle from which it is derived. Yet the 
specific examples, from SCP’s perspective, remain general statements. 
They are not specific enough for any particular situation. It is up to the 
practitioner to apply these techniques to specific situations or problems. 
They must be applied after an analysis of the situation that includes not only 
the specific circumstances of the crime, but also the specific circumstances 





36 Though as one reviewer pointed out, it could also be that these difficulties are simply 
illustrative of the creativity that is needed to reduce crime! 
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Table 1 
Twenty-Five Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention (Abbreviated) 
 
INCREASE THE EFFORT Harden targets 




INCREASE THE RISKS Extend guardianship 
Assist natural surveillance 
Reduce anonymity 
Utilize place managers 
Strengthen formal surveillance 





REDUCE PROVOCATIONS Reduce frustrations and stress 
Avoid disputes 
Reduce emotional arousal 
Neutralize peer pressure 
Discourage imitation 




Control drugs and alcohol 
B. THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING THE TWENTY-FIVE TECHNIQUES 
If SCP demands that crimes be analyzed with as much specificity as 
possible, how is it that these twenty-five techniques have been so easily 
applied to a wide range of crimes,37 such as identity theft, cybercrime, 
 
37 For discussions of SCP’s applications to these wide range of crimes, see SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 7 (applying SCP strategies to protecting endangered species); Clarke, supra note 
4 (discussing SCP strategies applied to prevent a variety of crimes such as prostitution, 
check forgeries, repeat burglary and subway graffiti); REDUCING TERRORISM THROUGH 
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION (Joshua D. Freilich & Graeme R. Newman eds., 25 Crime 
Prevention Studies, 2009) (collecting articles by various authors analyzing a variety of 
strategies that could be used to prevent different types of terrorism); Graeme R. Newman & 
Joshua D. Freilich, Extending the Reach of Situational Crime Prevention, in THE REASONING 
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trafficking in endangered species, terrorism, and many more whose specific 
situations have yet to be analyzed? 
Further reflection on the generality of each of the twenty-five 
techniques shows that they are examples of ways in which the guiding 
principles can be operationalized, but they do not tell us what to do. For 
instance, examining the well-known technique of “target harden” without 
looking at the examples would not tell us how specifically to analyze a 
target to determine how to harden it, or even how to figure out what is the 
likely target in the first place.38 The usual answer is that one must analyze 
the situation, and, once this is achieved, it will be obvious how to harden 
the target. 
But will it? Take the case of the 1982 Tylenol murders, in which seven 
people died as a result of taking Tylenol laced with cyanide by unknown 
persons.39 Was it obvious that the solution to hardening the target, in this 
case bottles of Tylenol (not the potential murder victims who were the 
actual targets—a significant insight in itself), lay not in changing the 
specific situational arrangements of the bottles in the drug store? Was it 
obvious that, similar to the British suicide drop, a response far removed 
from the crime location was needed? Was it clear that the solution was to 
change the bottles’ packaging, a decision that could be made only far away 
in the Johnson & Johnson corporate office and implemented at the place of 
manufacture? 
After all, in this case, the specific drug store that sold the Tylenol was 
located, and an analysis of the situation revealed that the tampering had 
occurred not at the factory level but in the store.40 A typical piecemeal, local 
SCP response might have called for installing cameras to keep the shelves 
under surveillance, or for moving all merchandise behind the counter to 
prevent its handling by customers. Instead, public outcry caused the 
response that occurred far away from the situation. The Federal Trade 
Commission entered the fray, and Johnson & Johnson introduced tamper-
evident packaging. Today, almost every company that markets consumable 
products, from lipstick to iced tea, uses tamper-proof or tamper-evident 
 
CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V. CLARKE, supra note 5, at 212 (discussing 
the application of SCP to a variety of crimes such as suicide, auto theft, cybercrime, child 
sex abuse migration and border control, organized crime, and tax evasion). 
38 See RONALD V. CLARKE & GRAEME R. NEWMAN, OUTSMARTING THE TERRORISTS 87–
107 (2006) (discussing a central problem in using target hardening principles to protect 
potential targets from terrorist attacks). 
39 Ben Kesling, Tylenol Killings Remain Unsolved and Unforgotten After 30 Years: FBI 
Hands off Inquiry to Chicago-Area Police; Victims' Kin Want Documents Unsealed, WALL 
ST. J., (Oct. 11, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023034925
04579115573613137300, archived at http://perma.cc/95N2-3V24. 
40 Id. 
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packaging. It may have been the most successful crime prevention response 
ever introduced. It prevented murders in specific locations from occurring 
everywhere. Of course, we do not know how many murders were 
prevented. And presumably, the widespread introduction of tamper-evident 
and tamper-proof packaging resulted from corporate and government 
policies. 
Laycock’s approach41 argues that of course attention was directed to 
Johnson & Johnson because they were the only ones capable of changing 
the packaging.42 But the prior step of identifying the packaging as the 
problem was required before the competency of the responder could be 
determined. This identification of the problem resulted in its “ownership” 
being transferred from the police to Johnson & Johnson. In other words, in 
terms of ownership of the big problem, prevention shifted to the 
multinational corporation. Meanwhile, the police were still stuck with the 
smaller problem of finding the murderer or murderers, who were never 
found. The Johnson & Johnson Tylenol example shows that, as one moves 
further away from the situation in search of a response, the nature of the 
problem changes, and the competency or ownership of the problem changes 
with it.43 This is an important point. Distal and proximate causes of crime 
and noncriminal problems are usually distinguished temporally.44 Thus, 
suffering from prenatal trauma is more distal than being bullied at school. 
In the Tylenol case, though, we are referring to distal in a multidimensional 
way to include not only actions that occurred much earlier, but also macro-
level as opposed to micro-level or piecemeal, local planning. In other 
words, our focus is on the proximity of the agent or agency with the 
 
41 Gloria Laycock, Deciding What to Do, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME PREVENTION AND 
COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 687, 690–92 (discussing local versus national level 
crime prevention responses to crimes). 
42 If a target for crime is a “hot product,” such as a smart phone, it may be preferable to 
focus on the product itself and to work on the national level to make it more resistant. For 
discussions on designing against crime (DAC), see Ekblom, supra note 22, at 53–56. 
Similarly, in a few cases, environmental design could be used on the national level to 
implement crime resistant building plans. Meanwhile, Lulham et al. note that SCP’s 
techniques are useful for identifying problems, qualities of products, and potential 
intervention points, but “were of little utility in the actual design process. We believe this 
paradox is common. Many products that effectively design out crime are developed using 
design processes that have little connection to established environmental criminology 
frameworks.” Rohan Lulham et al., Designing a Counterterrorism Trash Bin, in DESIGN 
AGAINST CRIME: CRIME PROOFING EVERYDAY PRODUCTS 131, 142 (Paul Ekblom ed., 27 
Crime Prevention Studies, 2012). 
43 For discussions about problem ownership, see Laycock, supra note 41, at 690–92. For 
a discussion on how competency may not necessarily mean that the person or organization 
owns the problem and vice versa (though this conundrum needs further elaboration), see 
Laycock, supra note 41, at 691. 
44 See Ekblom, supra note 29, at 204–05. 
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competency to address the situation. Importantly, the temptation to apply 
general responses to specific problems has lurked in the SCP literature for 
decades.45 One of Clarke’s initial introductions of SCP over thirty years ago 
noted that “a [general] ‘theory of crime’ would be almost as crude as a 
‘general theory of disease’”46 and called for focusing on “separate” and 
specific crimes. Interestingly though, a few pages later, Clarke noted that  
in some cases . . . it may be possible to protect a whole class of property, as the 
[British] Post Office did when they virtually eliminated theft from telephone kiosks by 
replacing the vulnerable aluminum coin-boxes with much stronger steel ones . . . a 
further example is provided by the recent law . . . which requires all motor-cyclists to 
wear crash helmets.47  
Since SCP’s main concern is crime prevention or reduction,48 its 
conceptual underpinnings and its policy implications (the interventions to 
reduce crime that flow from it) are intricately linked.49 Few SCP scholars 
have focused on this linkage.50 
C. DEVELOPING A GRADED FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTING LOCAL AND 
MACRO-LEVEL SCP RESPONSES 
The twenty-five techniques should thus be further elaborated to 
acknowledge that responses that are distant from the situation be taken into 
 
45 It would be wrong to assume that SCP has not acknowledged this difficulty. Clarke, 
supra note 4, at 12–15. Clarke and Newman clearly note the relevance of macro-level factors 
to specific problems with their elaborate diagrams of the opportunity structure for particular 
crimes (drug crime and terrorism respectively), but the linkage of macro or background 
factors to specific problems remains ephemeral. CLARKE & NEWMAN, supra note 38, at 7–9.  
46 Clarke, supra note 10, at 137. 
47 Id. at 141. 
48 See id. at 139 (discussing SCP’s main focus on crime reduction). 
49 A deeper discussion of this issue would take us beyond the purview of this paper. It 
harks back to the old debate between pure and applied theory implying an element of 
snobbery that somehow pure theory is superior to applied theory. Basically, what this means 
in the history of criminology is that theorizing about the causes of crime is a superior 
academic enterprise than theorizing about how to reduce it. It is worth noting that the 
essential elements of SCP were established before the theory of rational choice was 
incorporated into the theory, thus making it seem more respectable as a theory. Rational 
choice is not a necessary condition for the situational analysis of crime reduction. In fact, the 
aspect of “hard” situational crime requires simply the analysis of behavior, not cognition 
(i.e., rational choice). See Newman & Freilich, supra note 37, at 213–17.  
50 For example, Ekblom’s summary of his important work on SCP’s Designing Against 
Crime (DAC) framework notes that it can “act at any of the ecological levels of 
intervention,” and that a variety of observers have noted difficulty in moving “from problem 
to cause to intervention.” Ekblom, supra note 29, at 206, 214. He does not, however, discuss 
the possible inconsistency that might exist between a macro-level intervention and SCP’s 
specificity requirement, nor does he go into great detail on when one level is preferred over 
the other. 
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account and the subsequent ownership/competency of the problem likewise 
identified.51 It would take half a book to do this for each of the twenty-five 
techniques. Instead, we outline what these crime prevention schemes might 




51 This approach would lead to a classification of crime prevention schemes that is 
different from that of Bowers and Johnson. See Kate J. Bowers & Shane D. Johnson, 
Implementation Failure and Success: Some Lessons from England, in PUTTING THEORY TO 
WORK: IMPLEMENTING SITUATIONAL PREVENTION AND PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, supra 
note 8, at 163. This is because it remains tied to the general theory of rational choice (the five 
categories in Column 1, Table 1) and stays within the twenty-five specific policies. On the 
other hand, Bowers and Johnson include whether the prevention scheme is based on a 
dispositional view of the offender, though they do include other aspects of SCP, such as the 
agencies involved and the identification of the targets. Id. 
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Table 2 
Levels of Intervention for Hardening Targets 
 







Theft of cars 
in residential 
street 
 Improve street lighting 
 Owners lock cars 
 Owners move cars into 
garage 
Design of cars 
makes them too 
easy to steal 
Manufacturers 
redesign cars, install 
immobilizers 
Use of slugs 
in New York 
City parking 
meters 
 Do not use parking meters 
 Install surveillance 
cameras 
Parking meters 
are too easy to 
foil 
Install slug rejecter 
devices in meters; 
build more parking 
garages 
Bank robbery  Install shields for tellers 
 Guards at bank entrance 
 Install alarms, surveillance 
cameras 
Bank tellers are 
too obvious and 
inviting a target 
Install ATMs and do 
away with tellers 
















are too easy to 
counterfeit 
Make cards tamper 
proof;require PIN at 
point of sale. 
Robbery at 
ATMs 
 Install better lighting 
 Surveil place 
 Relocate ATM 






 Make coin boxes 
impregnable 
 Natural surveillance 
Money is the 
problem 
Phone cards bought 
elsewhere, 
ownership of 





 Formal surveillance 
 Natural surveillance 
 Police stings 





52 Ekblom similarly notes that designers sometimes reframe how the product is viewed. 
Ekblom, supra note 29, at 216.  
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Illegal 
immigration 






Shoplifting  Change display of goods 
 Surveillance 
Products are 
easy to steal 
Redesign products; 
put small products 




 Remove notices daily from 
phone booth 
Phone numbers, 
not the notices, 





Table 2 illustrates that the response that is distant from the situation 
applies not only to its specific situation (theft of cars in residential streets) 
but to the theft of cars in other situations as well. Thus, if one can locate the 
macro level of intervention for a problem, why not go straight to the “root 
cause” of the security flaw? It is also apparent that there are many 
situationally-bound responses that require intervention from a distant 
source. Building a fence along a national border, for example, while the 
need may be situationally determined, may require massive input from 
national governments. Making coin boxes impregnable may require that the 
original manufacturers agree to redesign or retrofit the product. 
The responses therefore may be classified roughly into three 
categories: situationally-bound local approaches, mixed, and macro, as 
outlined in Table 3.53 
  
 
53 See generally ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (Paul J. Brantingham & Patricia L. 
Brantingham eds., 1981) (discussing the various levels at which SCP interventions could be 
directed).  
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Table 3 
Responses Classified According to Distance from the Situation 
 
Situationally bound Mixed Macro 
ATM lighting 
Risk assessment of 
facilities 
Product layout in stores 
Video surveillance in 
stores 





authentication at point of 
sale 
Hide social security 
number 
 
National border control, 
fence design 
Video surveillance of 
roads, public (common) 
space 




















design (credit card 
security design, 
authentication—banks, 










As the listings in Table 3 indicate, some problems, perhaps even most 
problems, require a multilevel approach to responding. Take the example of 
credit card fraud. At the macro level, even the best-designed tamper-proof 
credit or smart cards will not prevent fraud if the middle organizations, such 
as retailers, do not install equipment necessary to eliminate human error at 
the point of sale.54 Consider also the introduction of steering column locks 
to prevent car theft. The first form of steering column locks was the steel 
bar, which users locked onto the steering wheel. But the effectiveness of 
these tools in preventing car theft obviously depends, at the situationally-
 
54 Graeme R. Newman, Check and Card Fraud: Guide No. 21, CENTER FOR PROBLEM-
ORIENTED POLICING 3 available at http://www.popcenter.org/problems/credit_card_fraud/
print/, archived at http://perma.cc/93F5-XAP5.  
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bound local level, on an individual user buying and installing the lock. 
Eventually, manufacturers began installing steering column locks in cars 
which were effective for some time in preventing theft.55 However, thieves 
figured out ways around the locks, so new technologies were needed. The 
locks have now been replaced with immobilizers and other electronic 
security systems installed by manufacturers. While these technologies have 
been found to be very effective,56 they do not prevent the theft of a car in 
which the owner has left the keys. 
Given this complexity in analyzing specific problems and, some might 
even say, the unanticipated consequences that may result from responding 
to specific local problems, how are we able to develop social policies that 
advocate action by individuals and organizations to prevent specific crimes? 
Is it logical for SCP advocates to make policy statements directed to 
individuals or organizations, such as, “do not publish social security 
numbers,” to prevent identity theft? Does this policy statement differ from 
the policy statement made by the medical profession that “smoking is 
damaging to your health,” and the subsequent requirement that this 
statement be placed on the packaging of cigarettes? 
The most serious barrier to converting SCP techniques into policy 
remains the gap between problem identification and problem response. As 
we have noted, SCP insists on the minute analysis of the problem to be 
solved, making the employment of intervention techniques highly specific 
to the situation’s time, place, and type of opportunity present. As Tilley 
explains, “the story of SCP is one of repeated small achievements.”57 
Furthermore, some SCP proponents like Popper argue that grand schemes 
and policies are doomed to failure because they are too abstract and 
unrealistic. Indeed, Knepper claims SCP is only applicable to problems that 
are “suitable for piecemeal experiments to alleviate them,”58 and Eck and 
Madensen note that SCP’s interventions are “at the meso-level . . . below 
large-scale social institutions.”59 In sum, many SCP proponents claim that 
grand initiatives are outside its purview. Yet it is clear from Table 3 that 
 
55 Barry Webb, Steering Column Locks and Motor Vehicle Theft: Evaluations from 
Three Countries, in 2 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 71, 71–72 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1994). 
56 See Rick Brown, The Effectiveness of Electronic Immobilization: Changing Patterns 
of Temporary and Permanent Vehicle Theft, in UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING CAR 
THEFT 101 (Michael G. Maxfield & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 17 Crime Prevention Studies, 
2004). 
57 Tilley, supra note 11, at 51. 
58 Knepper, supra note 12, at 35. 
59 John E. Eck & Tamara D. Madensen, Situational Crime Prevention Makes Problem-
Oriented Policing Work: The Importance of Interdependent Theories for Effective Policing, 
in THE REASONING CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V. CLARKE, supra note 5, 
at 80, 83. 
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many, if not all, situationally-bound local problems cannot be effectively or 
permanently solved without interventions at the meso or macro levels. 
Thus, how can SCP more consistently develop general social policy 
applicable to many situations—perhaps all situations—for a class of crimes, 
or even targeting a range of products and services, when it appears to view 
general responses as secondary? 
As we have noted throughout this Article, SCP has mostly eschewed 
ideal and abstract policies. However, policies that are evidence-driven 
surely should not be rejected out of hand by SCP, so long as their 
evidentiary link to the specific problem can be demonstrated. Criminal and 
other types of law develop and implement such policies. There are 
professionals—judges, lawyers, administrators and organizations like 
courts—whose role it is to apply these general statements of law to specific, 
even unique, cases. Indeed, proponents of SCP have researched the effects 
of particular legislation on specific crimes.60 
III. DISCUSSION 
SCP’s twenty-five techniques are more accurately classified as 
mechanisms for implementing a set of guiding principles that advocate a 
range of possible responses to potentially specific situations. However, 
depending on how the responder closest to the situation analyzes, or 
redefines, the specific problem, the response may be transferred to the 
person or organization most competent to respond to the problem. Again 
though, this outcome will depend on what kind of problem it is. Clearly, the 
ownership of the problem could be transferred in both directions, from the 
macro- to the local-level, and from the local- to the macro-level at various 
times. An example of the former relates to the protection of potential 
terrorist targets. Clarke and Newman argue that the “responsibility for 
protecting targets must ‘cascade’ down from the highest level of 
government to progressively lower levels (and to corporations and 
businesses).”61 These   “top-down” government initiatives to protect targets 
involve the sticky issue of the government’s role in implementing policies. 
At the same time, these government initiatives must acknowledge that 
many, if not all, of the situations described above are the domain of private 
businesses, local, national and multinational. Suffice it to say that, in many 
situations, it may be difficult for government to obtain businesses’ (and 
individuals’) consent to do what they want them to do to solve a particular 
 
60 See generally Johannes Knutsson & Eckart Kuhlhorn, Macro-measures Against 
Crime: The Example of Check Forgeries, in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: SUCCESSFUL 
CASE STUDIES, supra note 4, at 113 (discussing legislation that requires banks to verify 
identification before cashing a check). 
61 Clarke & Newman, supra note 38, at 218. 
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problem. The enormous increase in government regulation in the past few 
decades62 attests to the acknowledgment that governments are increasingly 
assuming the ownership of problems (e.g. global warming). And 
governments at the same time must rely on businesses and individuals to 
implement their policies. However, in the face of the doubtful effectiveness 
of government regulation63 in changing behavior (with some notable 
exceptions, such as car seat belt use) the question remains whether it makes 
practical sense to define the ownership of problems away from the 
situations in which they occur. 
The process also works in the other direction. For example, the first 
use of fences as a situational response to thwart suicide bombers and other 
terrorist infiltrators in both Israel and the West Bank was not implemented 
on the national level.64 Initially, local police and community leaders, who 
were trying to stop terrorists from making incursions into their 
communities, constructed these fences in a piecemeal fashion. It was only at 
a much later date that the use of physical barriers became national policy. 
Thus, if analyses of specific problems identify a consistently successful 
policy implemented in various locales, that policy could be considered for a 
supersized intervention.65 Similarly, heeding Tilley’s admonitions discussed 
above, perhaps national-level interventions should only be undertaken after 
analyses of local problems identify a consistently successful policy 
implemented piecemeal in various locales. This approach would help insure 
that if a policy failed to reduce crime or had unintended results, these 
negative consequences would only affect the specific locales that 
implemented the strategy. 
 
62 For a discussion in favor of using government regulations to reduce crime, see 
generally John E. Eck & Emily B. Eck, Crime Place and Pollution: Expanding Crime 
Reduction Options Through a Regulatory Approach, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 281 
(2012). The authors note that because crime is concentrated spatially and at specific 
locations, government regulatory options could be used to compel owners and others to take 
the necessary steps to reduce crime at their establishments and locations. 
63 Graeme R. Newman, A Market Approach to Crime Prevention, in DESIGN AGAINST 
CRIME: CRIME PROOFING EVERYDAY PRODUCTS, supra note 42, at 87, 87–91.  
64 Simon Perry et al., Using Physical Barriers to Prevent Terrorist Attacks: An 
Evaluation and Test of Crime Displacement Theory (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors). 
65 See Assaf Moghadam, How Al Qaeda Innovates, 22 SECURITY STUD. 466, 472–74 
(2013) (including a discussion on “bottom up” terrorist innovation that highlights the key 
roles terrorist “middle managers” and other subordinates play in devising innovative ideas 
and strategies). 
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A. PROBLEM OWNERSHIP 
In some cases, ownership may be “shared” by several potential 
responders.66 These responders usually include governmental agencies 
outside the legal system and private sector entities. Whether ownership is 
shared depends upon “the ways of thinking and working of whichever 
groups of applied social scientists or practitioners are [involved].”67 
However, the actual technique or action that should be implemented to 
respond to the problem remains a challenge to those given the task to solve. 
Presumably, finding a solution requires heavy input by designers, 
engineers, technicians, and others with technical and detailed knowledge of 
the problem at both the macro and micro levels. Again, SCP’s focus on 
agencies, organizations, and individuals beyond the criminal justice system 
to reduce crime distinguishes it from other criminological frameworks. 
At the macro level, corporate individuals may have to face such 
questions as: 
What are the implications of repackaging an entire line of products to prevent theft? 
How can we obtain cooperation from retailers to install new devices for authenticating 
credit card ownership? 
How can we design or redesign a product, its marketing, or its packaging to make it 
less attractive to steal but still attractive to buy? 
How can we convert theft-reduction techniques into profit centers, for example, 
marketing of virus protection software, converting retail store identification cards into 
special membership cards offering extra privileges. 
And at the local level: 
To what extent is this problem solvable at the micro level? 
Is this problem mostly situationally determined (in that local influences are interacting 
with the proximal causes) or is it mostly determined by factors distant from it? 
How can, or should, the problem be redefined and its ownership shifted to those 
distant from the situation? 
What policies are needed to make such shifts in ownership possible? 
Drawing from the CLAIMED68 framework, how can individuals or organizations—
whether within or distant from the situation—that are identified as competent to 
 
66 See Scott, supra note 29, at 392–405 (discussing how the police in responding to crime 
problems must at times cooperate with others, such as private citizens, other government 
agencies, or nongovernmental organizations—and share in the responsibility—to effectively 
reduce or eliminate the problem). 
67 Cornish & Smith, supra note 5, at 32. 
68 CLAIMED stands for: Clarify the task/role to be undertaken; Locate the appropriate 
agencies and individuals most suited for the requirement; Alert these agencies or individuals; 
Inform them; Motivate them; Empower them; Direct them. See Paul Ekblom, CRIME 
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address the problem, or parts of it, be mobilized to undertake particular prevention 
tasks and roles? 
Finally, specialists must also consider whether resistance from retailers 
or any other key constituent will be greater on either of the levels. And for 
crime prevention specialists, what are the overall advantages of a particular 
macro intervention that may have been derived from analysis of a specific 
local problem but may apply to many diverse situations? Macro 
interventions appear to be an effective way to prevent many crimes with 
one significant intervention. But is there any way to measure the preventive 
effect of such macro interventions, since the measure of their success is the 
number of crimes that did not happen? This challenge must be overcome if 
we want those distant from the specific situations of crime to acknowledge 
their responsibility for incorporating crime prevention techniques into their 
products, services, and marketing. Without a general solution to this 
measurement problem, the way forward to regulate the negative 
externalities of crime produced by corporations and other large 
organizations is severely hampered and will only ever be achieved on a 
piecemeal basis.69 
B. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 
What is the role for government? Do SCP attempts to implement 
national level prevention efforts inevitably lead to social engineering (long 
feared by SCP proponents)70 or excessive social control (also long feared by 
SCP critics)?71 On one hand, as noted, efforts to change people have mostly 
been shunned by SCP as too grand. Unlike the rest of criminology, which is 
offender-focused, SCP focuses on events, targets, and opportunities. 
Similarly, interventions aimed at redesigning products, like the changes to 
the British gas supply and Tylenol’s packaging, raise fewer social 
engineering worries.72  These are not utopian schemes designed to remake 
people: they are product-focused prevention efforts. Unlike grand initiatives 
to eliminate poverty, inequality, or crime, for that matter, SCP’s national 
 
PREVENTION, SECURITY AND COMMUNITY SAFETY USING THE 5IS FRAMEWORK 233–38 
(2011). 
69 For in-depth overviews of this measurement plan, see Clarke & Newman, supra note 
7, at 7–83; Newman, supra note 63. 
70 See generally Knepper, supra note 12, for a discussion of this issue. 
71 See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 170–71 (2001).  
72 While raising fewer concerns, attention still must be paid to legal and ethical issues. 
Ekblom reminds us that designers “must also consider whether their design violates privacy 
or unacceptably constrains freedom in some way—for example, a mobile phone which 
reports on someone’s movements, whether tracking him or her for his or her own good or for 
other people’s, without his or her awareness or free consent.” Ekblom, supra note 29, at 216. 
2015] TRANSFORMING PIECEMEAL SOCIAL ENGINEERING 227 
prevention efforts are not focused on abstract causes. SCP’s Tylenol 
solution, for instance, addressed general but concrete solutions: tamper-
proof packaging of all consumer products, not the causes of random 
murder.73 In other words, product redesign is accomplished by companies or 
organizations that have a vested interest in the product’s success and 
safety.74 
On the other hand, a more complex issue is not the redesign of 
products, but the national-level regulation of the use, or non-use, of 
products, goods, and substances by people. Some products, goods, or 
substances have been linked to many crimes (either as physical tools or as 
chemical disinhibitors) and are called crime facilitators. The most common 
examples are alcohol, drugs, and firearms. Laycock explains that these 
products or substances “facilitate or are variously involved in crimes 
locally. The rules governing these facilitators, and the ease with which they 
can be accessed, are [and should be] controlled by central government.”75 
Indeed, Van Dijk, in his address accepting the prestigious Stockholm 
Award, extolled the virtues of SCP and called for regulating access to crime 
facilitators. Van Dijk argued that “[t]he restriction of access to alcohol for 
young people would take a serious bite out of violent crime . . . . 
And . . . governments . . . should make every effort to reduce gun ownership 
among their population.”76 
While nationally restricting access to crime facilitators could reduce 
crime, it also raises the danger of a slippery slope toward social 
engineering. In addition to endorsing strict gun control laws,77 former New 
York City Mayor Bloomberg also favors regulating the intake of sugar 
through soft drinks and other similar foods and drinks.78 These sorts of 
initiatives affect everyone, and companies cannot simply implement them, 
unlike product redesign. With American society’s focus on individual 
 
73 Again, such actions might raise social control issues, if surveillance was also involved. 
But, these are not new criticisms. We elaborate on this point below in the Conclusion. 
74 Often, this is accomplished through (national or local) governments pressuring these 
companies. See Newman, supra notes 54 and 63.  However, as one reviewer of this article 
noted in the peer review, local campaigners (as with road safety) could also attempt such 
influence if they were not so focused on offender-oriented interventions. 
75 Laycock, supra note 41, at 694. 
76 Jan Van Dijk, Closing the Doors: Stockholm Prizewinners Lecture 34 (2012), 
available at https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1519203/120665_afsch_rede_van_Dijk_final.pdf, 
archived at https://perma.cc/6NV5-CT42. 
77 Mayor Bloomberg Teams Up with Boston Mayor for Gun Control Super Bowl Ad, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/03/
mayor-bloomberg-teams-up-menino-super-bowl-gun-control_n_1253093.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4Y3M-VF8Q. 
78 See Michael M. Grynbaum, Mayor Planning a Ban on Big Sizes of Sugary Drinks, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A1. 
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rights, it seems that implementing initiatives that require individuals to act 
in a certain way or that restrict them from acting in another way will be 
more controversial and difficult to achieve.79 Severely regulating or 
restricting access to products like alcohol, drugs, firearms, or, for that 
matter, sugar, could also paradoxically create crime if black markets 
emerge. After all, SCP has long noted that “opportunity makes the thief.”80 
The history of prohibition, and some could argue, the long war on drugs, 
provide some support for this notion. Further, SCP has consistently 
supported a “market” approach (a general, not specific, response) to achieve 
reductions in drug crimes and trafficking in stolen goods and in endangered 
species.81 
In sum, SCP proponents may first want to focus on product redesign, 
like guns that will fire only when held by registered owners, before 
considering regulation of crime facilitators. Importantly, though, any 
regulation that does occur would by definition be more limited and raise 
fewer concerns if implemented locally and piecemeal as opposed to through 
national policies. 
It remains to be seen just how far these kinds of controls will reach, 
given the resourcefulness of individuals and businesses in working their 
ways around such regulations. As Ekblom82 and others have shown, 
criminals who are dedicated to getting what they want are very resourceful 
at adapting their techniques in the face of preventive responses such as 
target hardening. The history of car theft, for example, clearly shows that 
each time new ways of thwarting car theft are introduced, thieves find a 
way around them.83 
 
79 A related observation is that many grand macro-level interventions have occurred in 
Europe, and not in the United States. This raises the interesting issue of the established 
divide that exists between the United States and Europe in embracing the role of SCP in 
reducing crime. It could be that the greater enthusiasm for SCP in Europe partially explains 
why grand macro-level interventions are more likely to occur there. Conversely, the arguably 
greater emphasis on individual liberty and personal autonomy (on both the libertarian right 
and the civil liberty left) in the United States may explain why grand interventions are less 
likely and the piecemeal approach is more favored there.  
80 See generally Marcus Felson & Ronald V. Clarke, Opportunity Makes the Thief: 
Practical Theory for Crime Prevention, in POLICE RESEARCH SERIES 1 (Police Research 
Series No. 98, 1998) (noting the important role opportunity plays in crime causation).  
81 For discussions of SCP and the market approach, see Newman, supra note 63, at 87–
105; Andrew M. Lemieux & Ronald V. Clarke, The International Ban on Ivory Sales and Its 
Effects on Elephant Poaching in Africa, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 451 (2009). 
82 See Paul Ekblom, Making Offenders Richer, in IMAGINATION FOR CRIME PREVENTION: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KEN PEASE 41 (Graham Farrell, et al. eds., 21 Crime Prevention 
Studies, 2007); Paul Ekblom & Nick Tilley, Going Equipped: Criminology, Situational 
Crime Prevention and the Resourceful Offender, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 376 (2000).  
83 See Michael G. Maxfield, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING CAR 
2015] TRANSFORMING PIECEMEAL SOCIAL ENGINEERING 229 
We have come a long way since Clarke first introduced SCP.84 All 
things considered, the theory has advanced rapidly. Other approaches to 
crime prevention have yet to even acknowledge that new policies are 
needed to prevent crime and that the ownership of many crime problems 
lies way beyond police. Few theories in criminology highlight crime 
prevention or even reduction as their prime concern. Conversely, SCP is a 
policy-based approach of prevention and requires rather little tinkering to 
apply its policies to many situations and to many levels of government and 
private organizations. Its guiding principles and their techniques apply 
easily and broadly to many diverse kinds of crimes. Indeed, its policies will 
become even more widely applied because SCP is so well-adapted to how 
crimes (methods, techniques, targets, etc.) change along with historical, 
cultural, and technological conditions. 
Yet when we examine the macro level of SCP as we have 
demonstrated in this Article, it is clear that many specific crimes cannot be 
successfully prevented or reduced without the cooperation of corporations, 
businesses, and other organizations in addition to the police. SCP therefore 
must continue to engage the same problem of social control, the central 
question addressed by sociologists since the creation of their discipline: 
How do you get people and organizations to do what you want?85 
IV. CRIMINOLOGY, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
Our final comments relate to a larger issue that has lurked in the 
background of this Article: the question of the relationship between science 
and policy. It is obvious that any attempt in SCP to move from scientific 
observation (e.g., evidence that availability of guns is a cause of gun 
violence) to a policy (e.g., criminalizing the ownership, use, or manufacture 
of guns) entails a large leap that leaves science behind and enters the murky 
fields of values and politics. In this respect, criminology has lagged behind 
other fields of science such as environmental pollution and climate change 
whose findings have motivated their advocates to convert their science into 
public policy, often with political and controversial results. For example, if 
 
THEFT, supra note 56.  
84 For a general overview of the SCP approach, see Clarke, supra note 10; Mayhew et 
al., supra note 10. 
85 SCP has addressed this issue in a number of ways, such as the CLAIMED framework 
discussed above. In addition, Kennedy’s innovative work on gun crime and open drug 
markets highlights the importance of leverage in influencing people’s behaviors. See David 
M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of 
Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449 (1997). This strategy relies upon cooperation between 
the police and community organizations and uses specific deterrence to “deter” particular 
chronic offenders by informing them that continued misbehavior will result in targeted 
arrest, prosecution, and enhanced sentences.  
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we take the public health problem of obesity and the presumption that it is 
the intake of too much sugar that is the cause, we may follow SCP’s first 
guiding principle and increase the effort needed to consume sugar. The final 
social policy, expressed in regulations as in New York City, may be to 
forbid the sale of sixteen-ounce containers of soda. 
One can see, however, that it is a leap from the scientific observation 
that individuals become obese because of the intake of too much sugar, to 
the final policy that forbids the sale of large containers of soda. This 
response was massive and general, but it was directed at a highly specific 
target. That this intervention will reduce the sugar intake and presumably 
solve the public health problems of diabetes and obesity of New Yorkers 
seems to anticipate the science rather than follow it. The scientific thing to 
do—evidence-driven public policy—would be to first assess if the proposed 
intervention is plausible a priori in terms of tested theory, and, if so, assess 
its effectiveness.86 One possibility would be to run trials to determine 
whether legislating against the sale of sixteen-ounce sodas actually does 
reduce sugar intake among New Yorkers. To put it another way, it is one 
thing to observe that sugar intake is bad for one’s health; it is another thing 
to legislate the reduction of sugar intake even though, from the SCP 
perspective, making sugar less accessible (increasing the effort needed to 
obtain sugar) fits nicely into SCP’s guiding principles of the Twenty-Five 
Techniques. SCP has always acknowledged that just because a policy could 
be implemented does not mean it should be employed. Those charged with 
designing the interventions are encouraged to weigh individual privacy and 
other rights with public safety and community concerns to devise the type 
of prevention policy society is most comfortable with.87 
In fact, policy statements directed against specific crimes with the goal 
of preventing them everywhere88 are commonly met with cries of 
overbearing control.89 These policy statements, after all, seek to prevent 
crimes before they happen (as in preventing cancer).90 But preventing 
 
86 See generally Mike Maxfield, Evaluation for Everyday Life, in THE REASONING 
CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V. CLARKE, supra note 5, at 119 (discussing 
evaluation research).  
87 See Marcus Felson & Ronald V. Clarke, The Ethics of Situational Crime Prevention, 
in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 197, 199, 215–16 (Graeme R. Newman, Ronald V. 
Clarke & Shlomo G. Shoham eds., 1997). 
88 This appears to reflect a contradiction, since if the crime is specific it could not occur 
everywhere. We return to this difficulty later. 
89 See GARLAND, supra note 71, at 170–71. 
90 We recognize, as was pointed out to us, that policy statements are not limited to 
regulation. Indeed, they often take the form of advice such as publicity campaigns designed 
to encourage or discourage behavior such as the “Don’t drink and drive” and “Lock it or lose 
it” campaigns. See Scott, supra note 29, at 399–400. 
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cancer appears to be a more popular justification for issuing blanket policies 
advocating social control, perhaps because particular corporations with 
deep pockets have been successfully sued for causing cancer. Social critics 
like Garland have imagined the onset of the “culture of control” and blamed 
SCP for it,91 yet they withhold criticism of the government entities and 
regulations that now control the tobacco industry.92 
A more complicated criminology example is the recent interest among 
some criminologists in “green criminology,” especially crimes against the 
environment. These criminologists have been joined by climatologists and 
other natural sciences in claiming that all of this pollution has caused 
climate change and that immediate action must be taken to address this 
problem. In the realm of criminology, Newman has observed that “radical 
criminologists” have taken just one position on this problem: they define 
environmental pollution as a crime and advocate that it be punished in the 
traditional manner (i.e., fines, prison, shaming, etc.).93 This approach is, 
from the SCP point of view, traditional rather than radical, since it directs 
its concern against the offenders rather than the situational environments. 
Newman asks the rhetorical question, what if we were to treat carbon 
production as a market problem rather than a crime problem?94 Which 
would be the most effective in reducing carbon? Even if we had such 
research, we would only be halfway there in terms of policy. The next step 
in formulating policy requires an assessment of costs, benefits, and values 
mixed in with the persuasiveness of the scientific findings. In the field of 
climate change, this process can take on quite remarkable contortions. The 
advocates who are scientists use the authority of science to claim that their 
problem trumps all other problems (e.g., world hunger, economic 
development). And the scientists who disagree are disparaged as skeptics, 
even though healthy skepticism is a hallowed principle of the scientific 
method. 
We hasten to add that we do not take sides on this issue. We simply 
use the climate change controversy to illustrate what may lie ahead for 
criminology as it moves increasingly into the realm of crime prevention. 
SCP is at the forefront of this frontier and has much to offer mainstream 
criminology. It may be argued that the controversies and issues of value are 
good reason for mainstream criminology to stay away from policy and 
 
91 See GARLAND, supra note 71, at 103–38, 170–71. 
92 There are many ways in which modern society has become one of control, but this has 
little to do with SCP’s advocacy of various interventions. Rather, one might argue that 
technology and historical conditions have been kind to SCP.  
93 Newman, supra note 63, at 89. 
94 Newman, supra note 63. For the sake of this example, we assume that the science 
pronouncing carbon as a threat to life on earth is valid. 
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defend the (presumed) neutrality of scientific criminology. However, 
modern technologies like social media, communications, and information 
technologies, bring with them new forms of crime along with the 
technologies of control designed to prevent them. Such technologies 
include surveillance and geospatial analysis linked into immense databases 
of personal information. Furthermore, the criminalization of terrorism will 
force criminologists to acknowledge the political nature of crime and both 
the necessity and difficulties in constructing policies to prevent it.95 These 
changes in the nature of crime as well as the possibilities to prevent it are 
already upon us. Like it or not, mainstream criminology will be dragged 
into the policy challenges of the preventive crime control in the near future. 
This paper has shown that SCP has already made great strides in this 
direction, but that the way forward, especially in terms of evidence-based 
crime prevention, faces many difficult challenges with respect to preserving 
and carefully defining the important link between science and policy. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have shown that Situational Crime Prevention, an 
action-oriented approach in criminology, could be harnessed to develop 
policies at the macro and local levels of society in the service of crime 
reduction. The graded approach that we have outlined for linking the macro 
and local levels of analysis in terms of problem definition and response 
provides a general framework for moving forward. Our goal in this Article 
was to outline a new criminology of social control. We view its publication 
in this particular journal, which deals in parallel fashion with the topics of 
criminal law and criminology, as highly appropriate and significant. We 
have shown that Situational Crime Prevention holds the key to spanning the 
gap between these two fields. This gap is rapidly being filled by an 
immense array of regulatory activity by governments at various levels and 
by innovative efforts on the part of corporations to circumvent, exploit, and 
comply with regulations aimed at the reduction of crime and other social 
problems. While the traditional response to crime is punishment 
administered by means of the criminal law and the justice system, SCP 
demonstrates that there are many alternatives to—including variations of—





95 For a discussion about the politics surrounding terrorism prevention policies and 
migration legislation, see CLARKE & NEWMAN, supra note 38, at 139–55. 
